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Labor and Employment *
by W. Jonathan Martin II **
and Patricia-Anne Brownback ***
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on case law concerning federal laws pertaining to
labor and employment.1 The following is a discussion of those opinions.2
II. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court of the United States issued multiple decisions
affecting labor and employment laws in 2020.
In Babb v. Wilkie,3 the plaintiff, Noris Babb, brought claims for
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)4
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)5 against the
Secretary of the Veteran’s Administration, Robert Wilkie.6 The Supreme
Court took this case to determine whether the federal-sector provision,
* The Authors would like to thank Aaron Chang and Amanda Morejon for their hard
work on the Article.
** Equity Partner in the Firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.B.A., cum laude, 1991); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992–
1994); Administrative Editor (1993–1994). Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012 & Supps.). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the Firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon, Georgia.
Mercer University (B.B.A., cum laude, 2013); Mercer University, Walter F. George School
of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (2014–2016); Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1 For an analysis of labor and employment law during the prior survey period, see W.
Jonathan Martin II, et. al., Labor and Employment Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey Law, 71
MERCER L. REV. 1059 (2020).
2 This Article will focus solely on published opinions by the Eleventh Circuit because
these are binding precedent on the Court.
3 140 S.Ct. 1168 (2020).
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2019).
5 29 U.S.C. § 633(a).
6 Wilkie, 140 S.Ct. at 1171.
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§ 633a(a), of the ADEA requires the type of heightened “but-for”
causation used in standard ADEA cases.7 Ultimately, the Court rejected
using the heightened standard.8
The plaintiff claims that she was discriminated against in three
specific instances: (1) her “advanced scope” designation was taken away,
which made her eligible for promotion on the federal government’s
General Scale from a GS–12 to a GS–13; (2) she was denied training
opportunities and was passed over for positions in the hospital’s
anticoagulation clinic; and (3) her holiday pay was reduced when she was
placed in a new position. The plaintiff relied on evidence that supervisors
made age-based comments to support her allegations that these
personnel decisions were based at least in part on her age.9
The Supreme Court held that under the federal-sector provision of
the ADEA, plaintiffs must show that “age must be a but-for cause of
discrimination—that is, of differential treatment—but not necessarily a
but-for cause of a personnel action itself.”10 The Court analyzed the plain
meaning of the statutory language and determined that “shall be made
free from any discrimination based on age” was the determining phrase.11
The Court interpreted this to mean that the decision-making process for
personnel decisions must not involve any consideration of age.12
However, at the end of the day, the government will not be liable for
damages unless the federal employee can show that age discrimination
was the but-for cause of the employment action.13 So, if the government
can show that the employment decision would have been made regardless
of the employee’s age, the government will not be liable for any damages
to the employee.14
In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia,15 the Supreme Court ruled
that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is a
form of “sex” discrimination prohibited under Title VII.16 This decision
resolved three lower court decisions: Bostock v. Clayton County (Eleventh

Id.
Id.
9 Id. at 1171.
10 Id. at 1173.
11 Id. at 1172 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)).
12 Id. at 1173–74.
13 Id. at 1177–78.
14 Id. at 1178.
15 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
16 Id. at 1746–47.
7
8
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Circuit)17 and Zarda v. Altitude Express (Second Circuit),18 which
involved sexual orientation discrimination, and EEOC v. R.G. (Sixth
Circuit),19 which involved gender identity discrimination.20
The Supreme Court determined that Title VII incorporates a “but-for”
test when someone is treated differently, and rejected the “sole cause”
argument.21 Under the sole cause argument, employees cannot recover
unless they show their protected class was the only reason the employer
discriminated against them.22 Here, the Court said that an employee can
show a violation of Title VII by showing that sex was a but-for reason for
the adverse action.23 The Court explained, “[i]f the employer intentionally
relies in part on an individual employee's sex when deciding to discharge
the employee—put differently, if changing the employee's sex would have
yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has
occurred.”24 Specifically pertaining to sexual orientation and gender
identity, “[s]ex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision,
[which is] exactly what Title VII forbids.”25 In rejecting the argument
that these protected characteristics are not spelled out in the statute,
Justice Gorsuch provided examples of other situations where protected
characteristics that were not specifically included in the statute, but are
incorporated under Title VII, such as sexual harassment and
“motherhood discrimination.”26 As a result of this decision, employees
may now bring charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) for discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity, and can eventually bring lawsuits against their
employers for the same.

17 723 F. App'x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
18 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), aff'd sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 140 S.
Ct. 1731 (2020).
19 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), aff'd sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 140 S.
Ct. 1731 (2020).
20 Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1738.
21 Id. at 1744.
22 Id. at 1748.
23 Id. at 1742.
24 Id. at 1741.
25 Id. at 1737.
26 Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1747.
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III. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)27 prohibits discrimination
by employers against qualified disabled individuals.28 A “disability”
under the ADA includes “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . a record of such
impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment . . . .”29
Major life activities include, among others, “caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,
standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”30
Cases brought under the ADA are examined under a burden-shifting
analysis, where the employee must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.31 To establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination,
an employee must show “(1) a disability, (2) that she was otherwise
qualified to perform the job, and (3) that she was discriminated against
based upon the disability.”32 Once an employee has made out a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to
demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.33 If
the employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination
disappears; however, the employee can still prove discrimination by
offering evidence demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is
pretextual.34
In Munoz v. Selig Enterprises Inc.,35 the plaintiff was an executive
assistant that suffered from chronic health issues related to her
reproductive organs. She was eventually terminated after her
supervisors said that her work performance deteriorated as a result of
her medical conditions. She brought suit alleging Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA)36 interference and retaliation37 and a failure to
accommodate and retaliation under the ADA.38 The United States

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12113.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
29 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
30 Id. at § 12102(2)(A).
31 Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004).
32 Id.
33 Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2005).
34 Americans with Disabilities Act Practice and Compliance Manual § 7:409 (2019);
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003).
35 981 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2020).
36 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (1993).
37 Discussed infra Section VI. Family and Medical Leave Act; Munoz, 981 F.3d. at 1271.
38 Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1271.
27
28
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District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary
judgment on her ADA claims because the plaintiff failed to show that she
was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.39
A disability under the ADA is defined as an impairment that
“substantially limits . . . a major life activity as compared to most people
in the general population.”40 This “include[s], but [is] not limited to,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working.”41 It can also include the operation of a major bodily function,
such as in this case, the endocrine or reproductive organs.42
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed
with the district court that the plaintiff failed to establish that she was
disabled under the ADA.43 The plaintiff claimed, but failed to present
evidence on the record, that she was limited in the major life activities of
working and sleeping.44 Further, there was no record that Munoz’s health
was impaired; there was no evidence of time, frequency, and duration of
her impairments; and she relied only on her testimony as to the affects
the medical conditions had on her.45 The plaintiff did not present
sufficient evidence that her reproductive system conditions substantially
limited her ability to procreate.46 The plaintiff did not carry her burden
to show the first prong of the ADA analysis, that she was disabled under
the ADA, and thus the district court was correct to grant summary
judgment for this claim.47
IV. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) does not allow employers
to discriminate based upon the protected classes of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.48 This includes limiting, segregating, or
classifying employees “in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
Id. at 1272.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
41 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
42 Id. at § 12102(2)(B).
43 Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1273–74.
44 Id. at 1273.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1274.
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
39
40
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religion, sex, or national origin.”49 For an employee to prove disparate
impact under Title VII, the employee must demonstrate that the
employer used a particular employment practice on the basis of one of
the above protected classes, and the employer cannot show that the
alleged practice is job-related and related with business necessity.50
“[T]he plaintiff in an employment discrimination lawsuit always has the
burden of demonstrating that, more probably than not, the employer took
an adverse employment action against him on the basis of a protected
personal characteristic.”51 The nature of discrimination suits generally
renders the “traditional framework” of direct evidence inadequate
because a plaintiff cannot easily prove “the state of mind of the person
making the employment decision.”52 “Furthermore, unlike some other
torts, in which state of mind can be inferred from the doing of the
forbidden act, the employer’s state of mind cannot be inferred solely from
the fact of the adverse employment action”53 Therefore, the Supreme
Court developed a three-part, burden-shifting analysis “[t]o make
matters somewhat easier for plaintiffs in employment discrimination
suits.”54
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green55 and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,56 the United States Supreme Court
established a three-step process for the “allocation of burdens and order
of presentation of proof” when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence to show discriminatory treatment.57 Under this framework, one
must first present a prima facie case of discrimination, and once a
plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden of production “shift[s] to
the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employe[r]’s [action].”58 After this, the plaintiff who retains the
burden of persuasion throughout, must then “show by the preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant’s legitimate reasons were not the
reasons that actually motivated its conduct, that the reasons were merely
a ‘pretext for discrimination.’”59
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
51 Wright v Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999).
52 Id. at 1289–1290.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
57 Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 594 (11th Cir. 1987).
58 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
59 MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Texas
Dep’t Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253).
49
50
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A. Harassment/Hostile Work Environment
In the Eleventh Circuit, for an employee to succeed on a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII, the employee must prove five
elements:
(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome
harassment, (3) the harassment was based on her race, (4) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of
her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working
environment, and (5) the employer is responsible for the environment
under a theory of vicarious or direct liability.60

In Fernandez v. Trees, Inc.,61 a Cuban employee sued his employer,
Trees, Inc. (the Company), alleging hostile work environment and
national origin discrimination.62 The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment for the Company
on both claims determining that the alleged conduct was not severe and
pervasive under the hostile work environment analysis, and the plaintiff
failed to present a prima facie case for national origin discrimination.63
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court on the national
origin discrimination claim, but overturned the hostile work
environment summary judgment ruling.64
The plaintiff worked as a foreman for a crew that provided utility
clearance and vegetation management for the Company. The plaintiff’s
supervisor got into an altercation with another Cuban employee, and
following that incident, the supervisor began using derogatory names
regarding Cuban employees he supervised.65 The plaintiff testified that
this name calling would occur on a near-daily basis, despite the plaintiff
asking his supervisor not to use these terms. After two months, the
plaintiff attempted to commit suicide at a job site by pouring gasoline on
himself and trying to light himself on fire. A co-worker prevented him
from doing so. The plaintiff was then terminated.66
In overturning the grant of summary judgment on the hostile work
environment claim, the Eleventh Circuit held that there was sufficient
evidence to raise a material issue of fact as to whether or not the
Smelter v. S. Home Care Services Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2018).
961 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2020).
62 Fernandez, 961 F.3d at 1152.
63 Id. at 1152.
64 Id. at 1156–57.
65 Id. at 1151. He would refer to them as “shitty Cubans,” “fucking Cubans,” and “crying,
whining Cubans.” Id.
66 Id. at 1151–52.
60
61
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supervisor’s conduct did rise to the level to create a hostile work
environment.67
Not only must a plaintiff establish a hostile work environment as
outlined above, to show that harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of his employment, an employee
must also prove that his work environment was both subjectively and
objectively hostile.68 “Turning to the objective inquiry, [the courts]
consider four factors when evaluating whether harassment was
objectively hostile: ‘(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the
conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct
unreasonably interferes with the employee's job performance.’”69
Beginning with the first factor, the plaintiff provided ample evidence
that the harassment he faced was frequent since the derogatory
comments were made almost daily by the supervisor.70 As to the second
factor, the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the
harassment was sufficiently severe.71 The supervisor's remarks
repeatedly targeted a protected group with vulgar and derogatory
language and continued unabated after complaints by the plaintiff and
his co-workers.72 This behavior likely meets the standard needed to
implicate Title VII where a workplace is “permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule and insult.”73 For the third factor, the plaintiff and
his co-workers testified that the degrading comments were not only
frequent, but also occurred in front of the whole crew, which was
especially degrading.74 Lastly, as to the fourth factor, the court held that
the evidence was not as clear or typical, but ultimately determined that
the plaintiff’s suicide attempt was not wholly unrelated to his job
performance.75
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff had raised enough of a
material issue to proceed with his hostile work environment claim.76

Id. at 1155–56.
Fernandez, 961 F.3d at 1153 (citing Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246
(11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1154.
72 Id. at 1155.
73 Id. at 1154 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
74 Id. at 1155.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1155–56.
67
68
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B. Retaliation
In Gogel v. Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia,77 a divided, en banc
Eleventh Circuit upheld the termination of a human resource
professional alleged to have recruited employees to join her legal action
against the company.78 In so doing, the court of appeals held that “when
the means by which an employee expresses her opposition ‘so interferes
with the performance’ of her job duties ‘that it renders her ineffective in
the position for which she was employed,’ this oppositional conduct is not
protected under Title VII’s opposition clause.”79
Gogel was the team relations manager at Kia Motors Manufacturing
Georgia (KMMG). Her job duties included investigating allegations of
harassment and discrimination, resolving conflicts, and resolving
employee complaints to avoid litigation.80 Among other things, Gogel was
unhappy with the way she believed that KMMG handled a specific
investigation of employee Diana Ledbetter. She also alleged that KMMG
discriminated against its female employees. After complaining of
discrimination, Gogel filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on
her own behalf. KMMG did not take issue with this charge and, in fact,
gave Gogel a significant year-end bonus a month later.81
During the holiday shut-down, the company discovered that Ledbetter
filed a charge of discrimination using the same law firm that represented
Gogel. In addition, two of Gogel’s subordinates came forward claiming
that Gogel was recruiting them to join her lawsuit.82 Accordingly, KMMG
terminated her employment because it lost confidence in her abilities to
remain objective in her position.83
The Eleventh Circuit held that, although filing a charge of
discrimination on her own behalf was protected activity under Title VII,
soliciting another employee to sue the company was not protected under
Title VII given Gogel’s position within the company.84 The court
explained that soliciting Ledbetter to join her lawsuit and providing
Ledbetter with the name of a lawyer so conflicted with Gogel’s duties as
the team relations manager that the conduct rendered her ineffective in
her position as a matter of law.85 In so holding, the court observed:
967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1127.
79 Id. at 1139.
80 Id. at 1145.
81 Id. 1153 (dissent).
82 Id. at 1130–31.
83 Id. at 1133.
84 Id. at 1150.
85 Id. at 1150.
77
78
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It is well established that the protection afforded by Title VII's
opposition clause is not absolute. To qualify for protection under the
opposition clause, the manner in which an employee expresses her
opposition to an allegedly discriminatory employment practice must
be reasonable. When examining the reasonableness of the manner of
an employee's conduct, we balanc[e] the purpose of the statute and the
need to protect individuals asserting their rights thereunder against
an employer's legitimate demands for loyalty, cooperation and a
generally productive work environment.86

In Johnson v. Miami-Dade County,87 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s ruling
that the Miami-Dade County Police Department did not terminate a
police officer because he filed a charge with the EEOC; however, the court
of appeals ultimately vacated and remanded a portion of the lower court’s
ruling because the district court did not use the Lewis v. City of Union
City88 comparator standard.89
Harrius Johnson filed charges with the EEOC alleging race and sex
discrimination. After he was fired by the county, he sued, not only
alleging race discrimination, but also retaliation because he was
terminated after filing the EEOC charges.90 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit held that Johnson, in the absence of valid comparator evidence,
could not prove retaliation.91 In doing so, the court held that negative
monthly evaluations were not materially adverse employment actions,
and thus could not support a claim of retaliation.92 Additionally, his
supervisor had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating
him—he tried to circumvent the proper chain of command, and
"[p]romoting the chain of command and punishing insubordination are
legitimate, important concerns for a police force . . . .”93
In attempting to show pretext, the plaintiff only pointed to the fact
that the employer imposed discipline on him fifty-eight days after he filed
the EEOC complaint.94 The court held that other courts have found that
timeframes shorter than fifty-eight days, absent other evidence, were

86 Id. at 1139 (quoting Rollins v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enf't, 868 F.2d 397, 400–01 (11th Cir.
1989)).
87 948 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2020).
88 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019).
89 Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1322–23.
90 Id. at 1322–24.
91 Id. at 1326.
92 Id. at 1326–27.
93 Id. at 1327.
94 Id.
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insufficient to establish pretext.95 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
partially upheld the lower court's ruling but remanded part of it for
reconsideration of the plaintiff’s comparator evidence under the new
standard adopted in Lewis.96
In Knox v. Roper Pump Co.,97 an African American father and
daughter worked in the same facility for separate but related companies.
One day, while off work, they got into an altercation and the father hit
the daughter. When they returned to work, the daughter reported the
father for violation of the workplace violence policy, and the father was
suspended as a result. While suspended, he called the employee hotline
and reported that he believed he was being discriminated against
because of his race. He stated that Caucasian employees were not
punished for similar conduct. The company said he could come back to
work if he completed anger management while he was on unpaid leave.
While Knox was completing the leave, the company presented him with
a Last Chance Agreement (LCA). The LCA also included a release of all
claims, including those under Title VII. When the plaintiff refused to sign
the LCA, he was terminated. He brought claims of race discrimination
and retaliation.98 The district court granted summary judgment on both
claims, citing a lack of proper comparators for the discrimination claim
and lack of evidence that the complaint was the but-for cause of his
termination.99
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the grant of summary
judgment on the discrimination claim was proper, but overturned
summary judgment for the retaliation claim.100 The court held that the
comparators presented by the plaintiff were not similarly situated in all
material respects as required under Lewis.101 However, the court found
that there was a question of fact as to whether or not the plaintiff’s
complaint of race discrimination was the but-for cause of his
termination.102 In coming to this conclusion, the court reasoned that the
release was included in the LCA because of the plaintiff’s complaint.103
Had the LCA not included the release, the plaintiff would have signed

Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1327–28.
Id. at 1322–23.
97 957 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2020).
98 Knox, 957 F.3d at 1240.
99 Id. at 1244.
100 Id. at 1249.
101 Id. at 1247 (citing Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218 (quotations omitted)).
102 Id. at 1245.
103 Id.
95
96
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the agreement, and would not have been terminated.104 Therefore,
through the chain of events, it is possible that but-for the plaintiff’s
complaint, he ultimately would not have been terminated.105
In Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc.,106 the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Worldpay US, Inc.
(Worldpay) for Title VII retaliation.107 Monaghan, a Caucasian woman
over forty, began as an executive assistant at Worldpay but was
terminated within ninety days. From the beginning, she was subjected to
racial and ageist comments by her African American supervisor. When
she complained to the executives about her supervisor, they told her just
to avoid her supervisor and to stop reporting the conduct. Monaghan’s
supervisor found out that she was complaining and threatened not only
her job, but also told her to “watch it,” because she knew where she lived.
Monaghan was eventually terminated, and she subsequently filed suit
claiming retaliation under Title VII.108 The district court granted
summary judgment for Worldpay and dismissed the claims.109 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and clarified the standard
for retaliation in this circuit.110
In reaching its conclusion to reverse, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed
the standard of proof required for retaliation under Title VII.111 To grant
summary judgment to Worldpay, the trial court relied on the standard
outlined in Gowski v. Peake112 finding that the “mistreatment at issue
was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
employment, thus constituting an adverse employment action.’”113 This
differs from the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,114 and confirmed by the
Eleventh Circuit in Crawford v. Carroll.115 There, the standard outlined
for “retaliation is material if it ‘well might have dissuade[d] a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”116 Here,
Monaghan argued that the trial court should not have applied the more
Id.
Id. at 1245–46.
106 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020).
107 Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 863.
108 Id. at 858–59.
109 Id. at 857.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 857.
112 682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012).
113 Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 862 (citing to Gowski, 682 F.3d at 1312).
114 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
115 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008).
116 Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 857 (quoting Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974).
104
105
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stringent standard from Gowski, but rather should have applied the
Burlington Northern standard.117 The court reviewed the differences in
the two standards and determined that the Gowski court relied on
§ 2000e-2(a)(1)118 instead of § 2000e-3(a),119 a different section of Title
VII. The court ultimately held that Gowski was inconsistent with
Burlington Northern, and where there is a conflict, the court is required
to resolve a dispute in panel decisions in favor of the oldest one.120 In this
case, that would be Burlington Northern.121
Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the
grounds that Monaghan could clearly meet the standard under
Burlington Northern.122 The facts clearly showed that Monaghan was
subject to conduct from her supervisor that “well might have dissuaded
[her] from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,” and she
should be able to proceed to a trial.123
In Martin v. Financial Asset Management Systems Inc.,124 the court
upheld a grant of summary judgment for retaliation under Title VII
based on the fact that the decision maker in Martin’s termination was
not aware of her complaints of sex and race discrimination.125 Martin was
hired as an operations manager and later promoted to director of
operations. She claimed that, during meetings with the CEO about her
performance, he would scream, kick chairs, and bang on the table. She
filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming that he did not behave this
way toward some of her white, male co-workers. This claim was mediated
and resolved, but about sixteen months later, the CEO berated her in
front of her peers. Following this incident, she complained to Human
Resources that the CEO was targeting her, and she needed to take a
couple of days off for her health. Human Resources told the CEO that she
thought she was being targeted for criticism and she needed to take some
time off. When the CEO could not get in touch with her following this
incident, he sent her a termination letter.126 She brought suit for
retaliation and the trial court granted summary judgment.127

Id. at 862.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
119 Id.; § 2000e-3(a).
120 Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 862.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 862–63.
123 Id.
124 959 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 2020).
125 Id. at 1050.
126 Martin, 959 F.3d at 1050–51.
127 Id. at 1051.
117
118

1232

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment based
on the fact that the plaintiff did not present evidence that the CEO, the
decision maker, knew of the employee’s protected activity.128 The plaintiff
claimed that the CEO’s knowledge of her prior complaint (filing with the
EEOC) was sufficient to show that he was aware, but the court denied
this.129 First, the significant time lapse between the previous EEOC’s
charge/resolution and her termination weakened the claim of
retaliation.130 Second, and most importantly, the plaintiff did not claim
that she was fired for her earlier complaint, only the most recent
complaint.131 Since she is unable to connect the two events, the grant of
summary judgment was proper.132
V. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)133 amended Title VII to
prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.134 It also prohibits
treating a woman (applicant or employee) unfavorably because of
childbirth or a medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.135
Like discrimination based on other characteristics under Title VII, for
claims under the PDA, courts use the three-part burden shifting analysis
under McDonnell Douglas where circumstantial evidence is used to prove
discrimination.136 In 2015, the Supreme Court in Young v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.137 adopted a new standard for evaluating the prima facie
case under the PDA.138
In Young, the Supreme Court adopted a new standard to be used in
PDA cases where indirect evidence of disparate treatment is used.139
Under the new framework, the plaintiff must show “that she belongs to
the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer
did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others
‘similar in their ability or inability to work.’”140 The court rejected the

Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1055–56.
130 Id. at 1056.
131 Id. at 1057.
132 Martin, 959 F.3d at 1058.
133 42 U.S. C § 2000e(k).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801–04.
137 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
138 Young, 575 U.S. at 229.
139 Id. at 228.
140 Id. at 229.
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“similarly situated comparator” analysis for the purposes of the PDA.141
Rather, the courts should focus solely on whether or not the employees’
ability or inability to work is the same or similar—no matter the cause
or reason for their situation.142
In Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp.,143 the Eleventh Circuit reversed and
remanded the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama’s
decision because the district court erred in its application of Young to the
case at hand.144
Durham worked as an EMT for Rural/Metro Corporation. She became
pregnant, and her doctor recommended that she restrict herself to not
lifting more than fifty pounds. As an EMT, she was required to be able to
lift at least one hundred pounds at any point. She informed the company
of her restrictions and requested an accommodation, but the company’s
policy was that it would not grant these restrictions for employees who
were not injured on the job. In the past, the company allowed other EMTs
who were injured on the job to work light duty positions when they were
limited on how much they could lift. When the company refused to
accommodate Durham, she filed suit for discrimination under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.145 The district court granted summary
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff did not present similarly
situated employees as comparators.146
Under the Young analysis, Durham’s reason for the lifting restriction
did not matter.147 Her inability to perform her position was the same as
those who were injured on the job, which satisfied the final prong of the
prima facie case.148 Because she did present similarly situated
comparators, the Eleventh Circuit sent the case back down to the district
court for re-examination.149
VI. FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) prohibits employers from
interfering with, restraining, denying the exercise of (or the attempt to
exercise) any of the rights under the FMLA.150 The Eleventh Circuit
Id. at 217.
Id. at 219.
143 955 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2020).
144 Durham, 955 F.3d at 1281.
145 Id. at 1281.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1286–87.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1287.
150 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
141
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recognizes two claims from aggrieved employees: retaliation and
interference claims.151 Under the FMLA, an employee is entitled to take
twelve weeks of leave over a twelve month period for their own serious
health conditions, or the serious health conditions of family members,
and be reinstated upon their return from leave.152 For interference
claims, employees must prove that they were denied their benefits under
the FMLA.153 However, the denial of a benefit is not the only way
employers can interfere with the right of an employee; an employer may
also be responsible for interference where it discourages its employees
from using the leave to which they are entitled.154
As for retaliation, an employee must prove that the employer
“intentionally discriminated against him in the form of an adverse
employment action for having exercised an FMLA right.”155 This can be
shown either through direct or circumstantial evidence.156 Where there
is only circumstantial evidence, the courts will apply the three-part
burden shifting analysis outlined in McDonnell Douglas.157 First, the
plaintiff must show the three elements of a prima facie case: “(1) [he]
engaged in [a] statutorily protected activity, (2) [he] suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) the decision was causally related to the
protected activity.”158 If the plaintiff can do this, the burden shifts to the
employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision.159 If the employer can do that, then the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext, or that the proffered reason is
not true.160
In Munoz v. Selig Enterprises Inc., as outlined above, the plaintiff
suffered from reproductive system conditions that caused her to be tardy
and miss work. She was ultimately terminated for performance issues.161
Like her ADA claims, the district court granted summary judgment on
her FMLA claims.162

Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1270 (citing Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham,
239 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001)).
156 Id. at 1270.
157 Id. at 1271.
158 Id. (quoting Shaaf v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1243 (2010)).
159 Id. at 1271.
160 Id.
161 Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1269–71.
162 Id. at 1272.
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The Eleventh Circuit upheld the grant of summary judgment as to
the plaintiff’s interference claims reasoning that the plaintiff did not
show she was harmed by the company’s failure to notify her of her FMLA
rights.163 Under the FMLA, the interference must result in damages for
the employee.164 Here, the plaintiff would have needed to present
evidence that her termination was a result of the company’s failure to
give her FMLA rights—she did not show this and thus the court said her
claim failed.165
However, as to the retaliation claim, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
and remanded the district court, finding that the plaintiff presented
questions of fact as to whether or not she was terminated for attempting
to exercise her rights under FMLA.166 The plaintiff properly provided
notice to her employer that she would need leave in the future.167 Shortly
after she gave this notice, her boss downloaded software to track her offtask time, and then after her treatment began, drafted a memo outlining
her performance deficiencies.168 The court held that the plaintiff met her
burden to show pretext by showing that her supervisors made many
negative comments about her leave.169 Therefore, the court held that a
jury could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff was terminated because
of her complaints and/or requests for leave.170
VII. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)171 requires employers to pay
covered employees engaged in commerce a minimum of $7.25 for all
hours worked.172 Additionally, if an employee works over forty hours in
any workweek, an employer is required to pay that employee overtime at
a rate of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate.173 Employees
can be “covered” by the FLSA in one of two ways: enterprise coverage or
individual coverage.174 For enterprise coverage, an employee must work
for an employer that has at least two employees and has an annual dollar

Id. at 1275.
29 U.S.C. § 2617.
165 Munoz, at 1274–75.
166 Id. at 1282.
167 Id. at 1276–77.
168 Id. at 1270.
169 Id. at 1278.
170 Id.
171 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
172 29 U.S.C. § 206(a).
173 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
174 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).
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of sales or business done of at least $500,000.175 Employees may be
covered individually if their work regularly involves them in commerce
between the states, and they are “engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce.”176
In Vasconcelo v. Miami Auto Max, Inc.,177 the plaintiff brought claims
against his employer for failure to pay wages correctly, seeking $12,000
in back pay plus liquidated damages. The defendant made an Offer of
Judgment under Rule 68 of the Rules of Civil Procedure178 for $3,500, but
the plaintiff turned down this offer. The case went to trial, where the
plaintiff was awarded $194.40. As the prevailing party, he was entitled
to recover his attorney’s fees, which he claimed totaled $60,000. The
district court reduced the attorney fee’s award to $13,038 (37%) and
taxed him $1,340.00 for costs incurred by the defendant after the Rule 68
offer.179 The plaintiff appealed the reduction of attorney’s fees and
taxation of costs.180
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s reduction of fees and
taxation of costs.181 The court reasoned that the trial court is well within
its discretion to reduce the fees, and the decision will not be set aside
unless it is clear abuse.182 As for the taxation of costs, the plaintiff argued
that the Offer of Judgment was ambiguous because it was not clear
whether it included attorneys’ fees and costs.183 The court rejected this
argument stating that it was clear from a plain reading of the offer that
attorneys’ fees were not included, and even if it was ambiguous, it would
have been construed against the drafter.184
VIII. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, the issues arising under labor and
employment law are becoming progressively more challenging each year.
Regardless of whether a practitioner specializes in state, federal,
administrative, or other matters pertaining to labor and employment, it
is important to recognize and stay abreast of the ever-evolving trends,
policies, cases, and federal guidelines. How the law will evolve, and
Id.
Id.
177 981 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2020).
178 FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
179 Vasconcelo, 981 F.3d at 937–39.
180 Id. at 939.
181 Id. at 940, 944.
182 Id. at 940.
183 Id. at 943.
184 Id.
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change, remains to be seen. For now, the cases above give practitioners
some guidance for the time being.

